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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAHf
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 860014

-vCategory No. 2

GEORGE CASH,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the jury a
lesser included offense instruction.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, George Cash, was charged with theftf a
second degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (1978), and
with being a habitual criminal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-1001
(1978) (R. 1, 19).
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second
degree felony theft (R. 18). Although the record indicates that
the trial court held a postconviction hearing on the habitual
criminal charge, the record does not disclose any disposition on
that charge (R. 128-35).

The court sentenced defendant to a term

of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for the theft
(R. 22).

STATEMENT QjF FACTS

In August 1985, Terry Deamer arranged with Car-a-Sell,
a used car dealership in Ogden, Utah, to sell on consignment his
black 1976 Chevrolet Corvette (R. 43). On the 19th of August,
defendant visited the Car-a-Sell lot, test drove Mr, Deamer1s
Corvette, spoke with a salesman about purchasing the vehicle, and
subsequently deposited $50 in order to hold it.

Defendant told

the salesman that he had won a large sum of money gambling and
wished to purchase the Corvette (R. 50-56, 84, 109).
The next day at closing time, defendant returned to
Car-a-Sell and filled out a credit application, giving a false
name and address (R. 58, 87, 110-111).

Although defendant knew

he had insufficient funds to purchase the vehicle, he
nevertheless made arrangements to come back to Car-a-Sell the
next day in order to close the deal.

However, before leaving,

defendant knowingly put the keys to the Corvette into his pocket
(R. 61, 88, 109, 112).
Later that night, defendant returned to Car-a-Sell,
entered the Corvette without authorization, started it and drove
it off the lot, fully realizing that the car was not rightfully
his.

He drove out of Ogden and, once in Wyoming, replaced the

license plates on the vehicle with his personalized plates that
said "E Z Cash" (R. 78, 88-89, 112-113).

He traveled through

several western states enroute to Rockport, Texas, his hometown.
After spending four days in Rockport, defendant resumed his trip,
traveling through New Mexico and Arizona (R. 90-100).
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Upon arriving in Kingman, Arizona, defendant reportedly
had $400 in cash*

He registered at a motel in Kingman for the

period of September 5th to 11th (R. 115) .

On September 6th, a

Kingman City police officer arrested defendant after stopping him
and determining that his vehicle had been reported stolen.
Defendant told the officer that he had wanted a Corvette since
the time he was fourteen-years-old and that he had purchased the
vehicle*

Defendant, who had filled out a job application while

in Kingman, also told the officer that he intended to settle
there (R. 65-68, 122).
At trial, defendant, although admitting that he
exercised unauthorized control over the Corvette, testified that
he intended to use it only temporarily.

He stated that he wished

to show off the car to family and friends and would have
eventually returned it.

He also claimed to have meticulously

cared for the car, washing and waxing it regularly and paying for
necessary repairs (R. 101-102, 121). Finally, he denied that he
ever planned to settle in Kingman, maintaining that he had only
wanted to find spot work there and then leave (R. 114-118).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because defendant has not included in the record on
appeal his requested instruction on joy riding, the denial of
which he challenges on appeal, this Court should not consider his
assignment of error.
Even if the Court were to reach the issue, defendants
argument is without merit.

Assuming that, under the first prong

of the test set forth in State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah

1983), there was the requisite relationship between the pertinent
theft and joy riding statutes, there was still no rational basis
in the evidence presented at defendant's trial for acquitting him
of theft and convicting him of joy riding.

Therefore, the trial

court properly denied defendant's request for an instruction on
joy riding.
ARGUMENT

PPiyr I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT INCLUDED HIS REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL, THE
COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW HIS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR;
ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO GIVE THE INSTRUCTION.
The record on appeal contains neither the jury
instructions given to the jury nor those that defendant
apparently requested.

Nevertheless, defendant argues on appeal

that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court
refused to give his requested lesser included offense instruction
on the crime defined in UTAH CODE ANN. S 41-1-109 (Supp. 1985)
(amended 1986) .
Although there is some limited discussion in the record
about defendant's proposed instruction (R. 24), that discussion
only discloses that it referred to § 41-1-109; it does not make
clear what the text of the instruction was. This Court has
repeatedly stated that it will not review the trial courtfs
allegedly erroneous denial of a defendant's requested instruction
unless the instruction is included in the record on appeal.
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1201 (Utah 1984); State v. Knill,
656 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Utah 1982).
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Because defendant has not

included his requested instruction in the record, the Court
should not consider his assignment of error.
Even if the Court were to consider defendant's claim,
the trial court properly refused to give an instruction under §
41-1-109.

In order to receive a lesser included offense

instruction, a defendant must show:

(1) the elements of both the

greater and lesser offenses are related and there is some overlap
of the evidence required to establish the commission of each
offense; and (2) the evidence provides a rational basis for both
acquitting of the greater offense and convicting of the lesser
included offense.

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 158-59 (Utah

1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(3)(a) and (4) (1978). Although
defendant may have satisfied the first prong of the Baker test,
he clearly failed to satisfy the second prong.
The elements of theft are:
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property
of another with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (1978).

In comparison, the version of

S 41-1-109 (the "joy riding" statute) in effect at the time of

defendant's offense provided in pertinent part:1
(1) Any person who takes or drives a vehicle,
not his own, without the consent of the owner
or lawful custodian and with intent to
temporarily deprive the owner or lawful
custodian of possession of the vehicle, and
returns the vehicle to the owner or lawful
custodian within 24 hours of the taking is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
(2) An offense under this section is a
third degree felony if the person returns
the vehicle more than 24 hours after the
taking.
Given this Court's rather expansive application of Baker's first
prong, see, e.g.. State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 1984)
(finding an overlap under Baker between assault and aggravated
kidnapping), the requisite overlap probably existed between the
1983 version of § 41-1-109 and § 76-6-404. CJL. State v. Cornish.
568 P.2d 360 (Utah 1977) (holding that the offense defined in the
pre-1983 version of S 41-1-109 was a lesser included offense of
theft).

However, the 1983 version of § 41-1-109 had as a

necessary element the return of the vehicle to its "owner or

1

In his brief defendant erroneously states that this version of
S 41-1-109 is currently in effect. See Brief of Appellant at 5.
Section 41-1-109 was amended in 1986 (see 1986 Utah Laws ch. 32,
S 1) and now provides in relevant part:
(1) Any person who exercises unauthorized control over
a vehicle, not his own, without the consent of the
owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily
deprive the owner or lawful custodian of possession of
the vehicle, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) An offense under this section is a third-degree
felony if the actor does not return the vehicle to
the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after
the exercise of unauthorized control.
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lawful custodian."2

T O read it otherwise, would be to ignore the

plain language of the statute. See State v. Fontana* 680 P.2d
1042, 1046 (Utah 1984) (Court has "statutory duty to construe the
provisions of the Criminal Code •according to the fair import of
their terms to promote justice and to effect the • . • general
purposes of section 76-1-104'"); Granite School District v. Salt
Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983) ("terms of a statute
are used advisedly and should be given an interpretation and
application which is in accord with their usually accepted
meanings").

On appeal, defendant points to no legislative

history or any other source to support his position that the 1983
version of § 41-1-109 did not, as a literal reading would
indicate, include return of the vehicle as an element of the
offense defined.

Because the evidence did not, under anyone's

interpretation, establish that defendant returned the vehicle,
the second prong of the Baker test was not met. When arrested,
defendant had the car hundreds of miles away from Ogden in
Kingman, Arizona; thus, there was no rational basis in the
evidence to acquit defendant of theft and to convict him of joy
riding.

This is precisely the conclusion reached by the trial

court (R. 124).
Finally, defendant cites no authority in support of his
suggestion that he could be convicted under § 41-1-109, even
without a return of the vehicle, because the police, by arresting
him, thwarted his efforts to do so. The plain language of the
2

This is not true of the pre-1983 version (see UTAH CODE ANN. §
41-1-109 (1981)) or the current version (see fn. 1 ) .

statute certainly does not support such a conclusion.

On the

issue of police intervention, the trial court correctly
concluded:
It seems to me that the reason for the change
[in the statute! is to encourage the return
of vehicles. If you get caught before you
return it, those are the breaks. . . . There
is nothing in [the statute] that says attempted
to return and was thwarted in that effort.
It just simply says the offense is a third
degree felony if the vehicle is returned more
than 24 hours after it happened. It didn*t
happen.
(R. 105).
Based upon the foregoing discussion, the trial court
properly refused to give defendant's requested instruction.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant's conviction
,

should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

J ^ d a y of September,

1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
0
Assistant Attorney General
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